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* 
 
This paper examines the effect of labor market opportunities on schooling-employment 
decisions in 12 urban areas in Argentina over 12 years, emphasizing the recession/crisis 
years 1998-2002. The effects of macroeconomic swings on schooling decisions are 
examined with a focus on whether the income or substitution effect dominates as 
macroeconomic conditions change. I demonstrate that over “typical” years deteriorating job 
rates (or wages) increase the probability of attending school and decrease the probability of 
combining work and school, particularly for boys. After controlling for household and 
individual characteristics I find that the probability of being in school for secondary school 
youth was about 6 percentage points higher in 2002 than in 1998 (before the recession 
started). In fact, a 10 percent decrease in the job rate alone has been responsible for a 5.4 
percentage point rise in the probability of school attendance since 2000. This effect is 
attenuated during the 2002 crisis when household expectations change in response to 
shocks. These estimates allow for the fact that a new Federal Education Law (FEL) in 1996 
extended mandatory education to 10 years and might have affected schooling outcomes. 
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How might macroeconomic crises impact school enrollment and labor mar-
ket decisions among the youth in a developing country? In the absence
of formal insurance and safety net mechanisms, the ability of families to
smooth economic shocks has been of concern to policymakers who wish to
minimize the long-term adverse implications of macroeconomic crises and
also maintain high levels of human capital.
If children or youth drop out of school and are sent into the labor market
in reaction to a fall in household income, the likelihood that they return to
school once the economic situation becomes more stable will be relatively
small. This can lead to a permanent decline in human capital and (lifetime)
earnings, particularly for less privileged youth.1 This has been the main
hypothesis tested in the literature for developing countries. However, the
fact that households may cut back on expenditures on the education of
their children during a crisis is plausible but not self-evident (Schady, 2004;
Thomas et al, 2004; Beegle et al, 2005a).
Negative macroeconomic shocks might well depress employment and
wage projections, and therefore the opportunity cost of going to school will
fall. Ceteris paribus, this should lead to increases in investment in human
capital. Nevertheless, a shock could also make borrowing constraints more
binding and thus decrease the amount of schooling chosen. These crises (if
persistent) might also lower expected lifetime earnings, thus changing the
marginal benet of attending school. Additionally, if the earnings of all in-
dividuals are reduced by the same share, the marginal benet of one more
year of education should be lower. But crises need not have a homogeneous
eect on (expected) earnings. As long as crises change the marginal costs
and benets of schooling, they may also aect their timing; and in partic-
ular, the degree to which youth combine school and work. Obviously, the
consequence of a crisis on adult or older siblings employment and incomes
in the household will aect the schooling-employment decisions of younger
children as well.
The total outcome will then depend on the relative size of the changes
in the marginal costs and benets, as well as on the cross-price elasticity of
children's employment and adult/older-siblings' wages. Overall, the eect of
macroeconomic 
uctuations on schooling-employment decisions is uncertain
in theory.
Combining these ambiguous results with the implementation of a Na-
tional Education Policy further complicates the analysis. However, there are
econometric techniques that are helpful in analyzing the eects of such poli-
cies and disentangling them from other outcomes. These methods exploit the
1 For instance, ve years subsequent to an experience of child labor, Beegle et al (2005b)
nd signicant negative eects on school participation and educational attainment, but
also nd substantially higher earnings for those (young) adults who worked as children.
2variation in treatment intensity across dierent groups to identify the eect
of the implementation of a given policy on variables such as school atten-
dance and employment, among others (Card and Krueger 1994, Du
o 2001).
Given such tentative predictions from the theory in terms of the eects
of macroeconomic crises on schooling and the lack of systematic analysis of
education policies in Latin America, careful country-specic empirical work
is needed.
The classic \drop out" story is that decreases in family income led chil-
dren to work outside the house or to undertake additional domestic tasks
so that other household members can participate in the labor market; and
this seems to hold for countries like Cote d'Ivoire and Vietnam (Jensen,
2000; Beegle et al 2005a). However, some authors nd positive impact on
schooling after negative shocks (Goldin 1999, Schady 2004), while others
suggest that by large enrollment decisions are unaected by macroeconomic
crises, especially moderate ones (Jacoby and Skouas, 1997; De Ferranti
et al, 2000; Thomas et al, 2004). In sum, the eects of income shocks on
schooling seem to vary considerably by country as well as by the nature of
the crisis.
For Argentina the scant existing evidence has so far been contradictory.
Espa~ na et al (2003) nd that the crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s did
not change overall enrollment levels; while Rucci (2004) nds that shocks in
Argentina led to declines in schooling over the 1998-2002 recession.2 This
paper moves away from the focus on the eects of shocks on credit con-
straints (or income eect) and considers the extent to which 
uctuations
in local labor markets opportunities and changes in the organization of the
education system might also have eects on schooling and employment de-
cisions.
I analyze these two eects with microdata on secondary school-age youth
in Argentina in the 1992-2003 period using a multinomial logit to take into
account the joint nature of school-employment decisions while controlling
for other covariates. 3
Most of the earlier studies on this topic have focused on the binary
2 I will argue that results have been contradictory for two reasons: rst, the chosen
sample (i.e. Rucci uses the 12-17 year-olds and Espa~ na et al use two samples: 6-14 and
18-25 year-olds); while the relevant sample should be the secondary-school aged that are
closer to marginal decisions (i.e. 13-18 year-olds); and second, the identication strategy
(i.e. Rucci identies the shocks with the trend of the Brazil-Argentina exchange rate,
while Espa~ na et al do not have a clear identication strategy).
3 Another advantage of the multinomial logit is that it does not impose an arbitrary
structure on the outcomes. However, other natural alternatives would be a conditional
logit model which requires detailed longitudinal data. Also the multinomial probit model
that makes calculation of maximum likelihood infeasible for more than ve alternatives
as it involves multiple integrals (Wooldridge 2002); and a bivariate probit model which
imposes only a four-choice model. The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
hypothesis can also be relaxed by specifying a hierarchical model, ranking the choice
alternatives. The most popular of these is called the nested logit model (Hausman and
McFadden, 1984). Again the problem is that in the Argentine data there is no information
on choice attributes.
3choice between school and work or the fourfold choice among school, work,
school and work, or neither. Although these studies have provided policy
makers with information about the factors in
uencing schooling and labor
decisions of school-age youth, there is more to be learned from a further
disaggregated analysis of this choice by also considering unemployed youth
(i.e. those seeking work but not working). This is particularly relevant for
a high-unemployment country like Argentina, in which the proportion of in-
active youth (i.e. no-work no-school) is one of the highest in Latin America
reaching about 15 percent of 15-18 year olds.4 An analysis with this level of
detail can be undertaken using the data provided by the Encuesta Perma-
nente de Hogares (Argentine Permanent Household Survey, EPH hereafter),
which allow me to distinguish between six choices facing school-aged youth:
school only, work only, school and work, inactive, unemployed only, school
and unemployed. One of the contributions of this paper is that I show that
it is not justiable on statistical grounds to pool any of the six choices.
In terms of the identication strategy, the main diculty is to nd an
appropriate proxy for the opportunity cost of youth. Some studies include
the child's wage as a proxy, but because not many children work, estimates of
children's wages are subject to serious selectivity biases. In Brazil, the eects
of local labor market opportunities on schooling have been identied by the
variation across states in wage movements (Duryea and Arends Kuenning
2003). However, in Argentina unemployment has been one of the most
important results of crises, even though \discouraged worker" eects were
also a byproduct of the mid-1990s crises.
For this reason, the identication strategy mainly relies on the variation
across urban-areas in job rates, but also unemployment and wage rates of
low skilled adults. 5 The eects of macroeconomic swings on schooling
decisions are examined with a focus on whether the income or substitution
eect dominates as macroeconomic conditions change.6
Lastly, in order to unravel the eect of the new education policy, I make
use of the change in the Federal Education Law (FEL) in 1996 in Argentina
that extended mandatory education from seven to ten years. This quasi-
experiment can be used to disentangle the aggregate labor market eects
and the eects of the Law itself both identied at the urban area level. The
4 Moreover the inactivity rate kept increasing until 1998, a feature which needs to be
taken into account in the econometric model.
5 Urban-area level wages have not 
uctuated as much as urban-area level employment
rates before the 2002 crisis; still I show results using wages as a measure of the opportunity
cost.
6The substitution eect \story" comes from two empirical observations: First, per-
capita household income decreased by almost 30 percent for all deciles and all levels of
education during the 2000/2002 crisis which seems to support a uniform across-the-board
decrease in expected earnings. Secondly, the secular increasing trend in the marginal
benets to schooling stopped in 1998, just before the start of the recession in 1999. It
therefore seems unlikely that changes in access to credit or in rates of return to education
can explain the patters of attendance in Argentina, at least over the recession crisis period
of 1998 to 2002.
4education reform was gradual, in the sense that every year a new province
(or set of provinces) adopted the FEL, providing variation that can be
exploited in the empirical analysis.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section shows
schooling and employment trends in Argentina from 1992 to 2003, surveys
the nature of the crises and also describes the Federal Education Law. Sec-
tion 2 gives details on the theoretical and econometrical framework of anal-
ysis. Section 3 brie
y explains the data, while Section 4 describes the em-
pirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
1 Schooling and Employment Trends
1.1 Aggregate 
uctuations, enrollment and employment
Before proceeding with the analysis of factors associated with youth educa-
tional and employment outcomes I give a brief overview of basic indicators
from 1992 to 2003. It is important to highlight that although Argentina is
a developing country, the education sector ranks highly in comparison with
other countries. Average years of schooling for the population aged 15 and
over in 2000 were 8.8, signicantly higher than the Latin-American average
of 5.9 years. It is important to note that in 2004, 77 percent of students
(initial, primary and secondary education) were in public schools.7 More-
over, from 1991 to 2001 enrollment growth was 33 percent points higher
than population growth for those aged 15-17.
In terms of child labor, the law protects children from exploitation in the
workplace and sets the minimum age for employment at 14 years, although
in rare cases the Ministry of Education may authorize a younger child to
work as part of a family unit. Children between the ages of 14 and 18 may
work in a limited number of job categories and for limited hours if they have
completed compulsory schooling, which normally ends at age 15.8 In 2004
the National Commission for the Eradication of Child Labor (CONAETI)
estimated that up to 1.5 million children, or 22 percent of the children
under the age of 15, worked in some capacity. Most illegal child labor
took place in the informal sector, where inspectors had limited ability to
enforce the law. Child labor in urban zones included work such as small-
scale garment production, trash recycling, street sales, domestic service, and
food preparation. Children also were involved in prostitution, sex tourism,
and drug tracking.
I present a synopsis of attendance, employment, unemployment and inac-
tivity trends of 5-25 year old in Figures 1 to 3 in the Appendix. Attendance
rates rose for all those aged 12-25 from 1992 to 2002, attaining 100 percent
7 Therefore, schooling decisions should not be largely aected by fees.
8 See section 1.2 for more details on Argentina's educational structure.
5of attendance for 12-14 year olds by the end of the decade. Those aged 12-18
years had the largest increases in attendance rates.
On the other hand, employment rates went down, this eect being
strongest for those aged 15-18 from 1998 onwards. 9 Figure 2 shows 12-
17 year-olds combining work and school more in 1992 than in any other
year (except for those aged 15).10 However, the highest rate of youth com-
bining employment and schooling at age 18 is found in 1999, which coincides
with the highest unemployment rate recorded up until that year. On the
other hand, the proportion of inactive 5-18 year-old went down by 2.5 per-
centage points from 1992 to 2002. This decline was more pronounced for
12 to 18-year-olds, for whom this proportion decreased by 3.5 percentage
points. For those over the age of 16 the inactivity rate goes up over time
reaching 20 percent for all those over the age of 20.
Figure 4 summarizes these information for the population of interest
(13-18 year-olds) and shows the prediction for secondary-school attendance
based on a linear regression of attendance on time (t=1, 2, ...n), along with a
95 percent condence level interval. This is presented by relevant age-group
and gender.
Overall, the raw data and the tted values are compelling evidence point-
ing towards the fact that the schooling trend before 1997 is clearly dierent
from the trend after 1997. 11 There are two competing plausible explana-
tions for these trends: the aggregate macroeconomic eects on employment
levels and the implementation of a new Federal Education Law extending
the number of years that youth have to stay in school.12
Argentina suered two shocks over this period: in 1995, Argentina the
shock has been caused by the contagion eect from the Mexican currency
crisis. In consequence massive amounts of capital were pulled out of the
country, unemployment rose to 18.4 percent and GDP fell by 2.8 percent. In
2002, the crisis was of a dierent nature. The Government could not sustain
the peg of the national currency (the peso) and was forced to devalue by
40 percent. This devaluation was then followed by a historic debt default,
GDP fell by 10.9 percent and unemployment went up to 21.5 percent. As
shown in Figure 4, after the 1995 shock there is a negative change in the
enrollment rates, particular those of 15-18-year-old females, while after the
2002 shock one can observe that enrollment rates for both genders equally
halted the increasing trend in attendance observed from 1997 to 2001. I
describe the Federal Education Law and its plausible eects brie
y in the
9It should be noted that unemployment rates for workers under 20 year old are 3 times
higher than the unemployment rates of workers aged 35 and over.
10 Combining work with school is dened as a dummy equal to one if the 12-17 year-olds
report to be working in the reference week and at the same time report to be attending
school.
11 In despite of the small 't' (t=12) I also show the Zivot-Andrews (1992) unit root test
in Figure 4
12 The fall in employment rates was particularly harsh for 15-18 year olds after 1998
6next subsection.
1.2 The Federal Education Law
Following the pattern of educational policies in Latin American countries
during the 1990s, a new reform programme was launched by the Federal
Government resulting in, among other laws: the Federal Education Law
in 1993 (FEL hereafter). Despite the fact that this Law had been already
sanctioned, the implementation only began in 1996. The reform was gradual,
and from 1996 a dierent set of provinces implemented the reform each year,
until the last of the implementing provinces, Mendoza, applied it in 2000.
As of 2003, however, only 17 out of 24 provinces had carried out the reform
completely, and ve provinces were still in the phase of pilots programs or
partial implementation.
The degree of implementation varied from one province to another. The
reforms covered dierent areas, but I focus on only one: the extension of
mandatory education from seven to 10 years.13 All students are poten-
tially subject to the eects of FEL and each province decides whether to
implement it, as well as whether to engage in generalized or gradual imple-
mentation. Inconclusive evidence on the exogeneity of adoption of the Law
turns out to be crucial as I explain in the empirical strategy section.
The greatest change in this new organization of education aects youth
aged 12 to 14 years through the following areas of curriculum reform: (i)
Nine years of General Basic Education{ EGB1, EGB2 and EGB3{ for 6-14
year old children (now mandatory) and (ii) Three or four years of Polymodal
or High School for 15 to 17-18 year olds (not mandatory).
As shown in the rst column of Table 1, only two provinces (Buenos
Aires and Cordoba) implemented the reform in 1996. At the time this
paper was written, only two provinces (R o Negro and Ciudad Aut onoma
de Buenos Aires) have not applied the reform. However, only a few provinces
followed a full implementation policy.14 Column (iv) shows the years since
the FEL was applied. This variable was constructed based on column (i)
and taking as reference the year 2000. Nearly 75 percent of total gross
enrollment in secondary school for the year 1996 was in provinces which
fully implemented the FEL (column (v)). Buenos Aires province represents
37.3 percent of total enrollment (or 49.5 percent of all students in FEL
provinces). I comment more on the last column in Section 3.
The following sections will explore the extent to which the observed
increase in attendance for 13 to 18-year-olds was a consequence of the lack of
13 Other areas of reforms were: (i) the transfer of national responsibilities to the
provinces for secondary and technical education; and for teacher training institutions,
(ii) curricular reform; (iii) administrative reforms and (iv) higher education reform.
14 This was quite a common strategy with nine provinces beginning with this modality
(see column (iii) of Table 1).
7employment opportunities, this new Law or a combination of these factors.15
2 Theoretical and Econometric Framework
2.1 Theoretical Framework
Empirical research on schooling investment has been inspired by the stan-
dard neoclassical Becker model of human capital accumulation where indi-
viduals acquire education until the (expected) marginal benet of an ad-
ditional year of education equals the marginal cost (Figure 5).16 The un-
derlying assumptions are: complete markets, the only cost of schooling is
foregone earnings and fees, youth earn nothing while at school and no value
is attached to education as a consumption good (Rosen 1977, Willis 1986).
However, in a developing country like Argentina, two features of the school-
ing decision problem are missing. The rst is, additional (i.e. part-time or
full time) earnings which may lead to a lower cost of an additional year of
education 17 and the second, incomplete markets and borrowing constraints
that may lead to under-investment in human capital (Becker 1964, Galor
and Zeira 1993, Jacoby 1994). In a model with altruism (Andreoni 1989),
borrowing constraints will then prevent perfect smoothing of consumption,
and the outcome will be, if labor displaces schooling (Ravallion and Wodon
2000), underinvestment in human capital as a by product of child/youth
labor (Basu and Van 1998).
The marginal private benet curve depends on the expected private gains
(i.e. in wages/salaries in labor markets where, for instance, returns to educa-
tion and unemployment rates will play a role) to human capital investment.
The marginal private cost may increase with human resource investments
because of the increasing opportunity costs of more time devoted to such in-
vestments and because of increasing marginal private costs of borrowing on
nancial markets (if such markets do not easily permit borrowing for such
purposes, at some point the marginal private cost curve may become very
15 Galiani and Schargrodsky (2001) used a dierent aspect of the same political experi-
ment. They exploit the generated exogenous variation in the jurisdiction of administration
of secondary schools across time and space in order to identify the causal eect of school
decentralization on education quality, measured by the outcome of a standardized test of
Spanish and Mathematics administered to students in their nal year of secondary school.
Crosta (2007) evaluates the relationship between the FEL, access to schooling and the
quality of schooling. However, he does not use the nationally representative and compa-
rable EPH surveys as he only has the Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida -2001 survey.
16 As is common in the literature I assume that parents decide investments in education
for under{18 year-old.
17 The organization of the secondary school curriculum in Argentina is such that a full-
time job should not be possible to maintain while studying. However, I found that those
13-18 year-olds that report to be employed are working an average of 37 hours/week (vis
a vis 44 hours/week for those aged 15-62), which is compatible with the denition of full
time job, and therefore seems to indicate that labor is not displacing school, but rather
leisure time (Ravallion and Wodon 2000). On the other hand, only 35 percent of those
13-18 year old that are employed work 25 hours/week or less.
8steep or even vertical). Moreover, the possibility of working will have two
eects: via the income eect it might reduce credit constraints and then de-
crease the private marginal cost of borrowing on nancial markets, therefore
leading to a higher investment in human capital. Via the opportunity cost,
the substitution eect will in turn decrease investment in human capital.
In this framework researchers have studied the eects of various factors
such as household income shocks, returns to education and family back-
ground on the marginal costs and benets of an additional year of educa-
tion.18
There is also considerable evidence of convex rather than concave earnings-
education proles in developing countries (S oderbom et al, 2006) , including
Argentina (L opez B oo, 2008) (Lopez Boo 2008). Therefore an individual
needs to complete a considerable number of years of schooling in order to
reap substantial gains from her investment. Consequently, a large education
budget may be necessary if schooling is evaluated as a human capital in-
vestment, and one would therefore expect household income to matter in a
very direct way when evaluating educational outcomes. Unsurprisingly, the
developing country literature has found a systematic relationship between
educational outcomes and family income (Behrman and Knowles 1999). The
positive impact of income is also used by many as evidence of binding credit
constraints in developing countries.
In this paper I move away from credit constraints and the traditional
determinants of schooling-employment decisions to concentrate on the eects
of macroeconomic crises controlling by the implementation of the FEL,
and explore whether income or substitution eects dominate with aggregate
changes in local labor market opportunities.
2.2 Econometric Approach: Multinomial Logit Models for
School-Employment Decisions
I employ a reduced-form production function to examine the eect of ag-
gregate changes in labor market conditions and the FEL on attendance-
work decisions of school-aged youth. This can be performed by means of
a multinomial logit if one wants to take into account the joint nature of
school-labor decisions while controlling for other covariates. The multino-
mial logit specication is attractive in applied work, due to its simplicity, at
the cost of parametric and (testable) independence assumptions.19 For in-
18 It is well-known that variables like the occupation of the mother and the father,
parental education (usually a proxy for permanent income) and the mother being in the
labor force are strong predictors of schooling levels in Latin America. Sometimes these
variables are even more important determinants of educational attaintment that household
income is (Hausmann and Szekely 2001, Behrman, Birdsall, and Szekely 2000). This seems
to be the case for the Greater Buenos Aires (GBA) (Sosa and Marchionni 1999).
19 The multinomial logit clearly suers of a serious shortcoming when analyzing the
secondary-school aged labor market, because it assumes the hypothesis of independence
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA hypothesis). In this context, this would imply that labour
9stance, if students with a high graduation probability decide to go to school
and those with a low probability decide to work (and not attend school),
then the multinomial logit would not be the correct model. Evidence for
Argentina admits, however, that this ordering may not be appropriate, par-
ticularly when considering the choice between school and work (Sosa and
Marchionni 1999). If there is no clear ordering then the multinomial logit
model is the preferred specication since it does not impose an arbitrary
structure on the outcomes (Long 1997).
Most of the earlier studies have focused either on the binary choice be-
tween school and work (de Janvry et al, 2006) ; while some consider the
four-fold choice between school only, work only, school and work, or neither
(Duryea and Arends Kuenning 2003). Although these studies have provided
policy makers with crucial information about the factors in
uencing school-
labor decisions of school-age youth, there is more to be learned by further
disaggregation. This can be done using the data provided by EPH, which
allow me to distinguish between six choices facing secondary school-aged
youth: school only, work only, unemployed only, school and work, school and
unemployed and inactive. Ideally, I should estimate a nested logit model or
a random parameters logit model, which are plausibly a more appropriate
specication. 20 21 However, due to data limitations (i.e. no information on
choice-specic attributes) I am unable to estimate such models. However,
I show by means of Hausman-type test of the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) that it is not justiable on statistical grounds to pool any
of the six choices.22
I model the schooling-employment decision following the literature on
occupational choice, using a latent variable approach. The latent variable is
the propensity to sort into a given activity. Only the outcome and not the
underlying propensity is actually observed:
yj
 = Z
j + j (1)
Depending on whether one conditions on \some activity" I can have
market choices be independent from education. I explain how I deal with this in Section
2.4
20 The nested logit model is a generalization of the multinomial logit model that allows
error terms to be correlated across alternatives within a subgroup of choices. The nesting
structure would have asumed that the error terms of the schooling choice (in this case are
school only, school and work and school and unemployment) are correlated as so are the
errors terms of the no-schooling choice. On the other hand, the random parameters logit
(also called `mixed logit' when the log-normal rather than the normal distribution is used
for parameters whose sign is known a priori) also permit the utilities of each alternative
to be correlated.
21 The multinomial probit has been rarely used in this context as it is more challenging to
estimate for more than four choices. I have estimated multinomial probits as a robustness
check and the main results remain unaltered (these are available upon request).
22 However, in order to take into account small sample sizes when splitting age groups
I pool some categories (i.e. unemployed and employed are pooled as active) in some
regressions, while those in school and reporting to be unemployed (very small number of
observations per year) will be merged onto the \school only" category.
10three or four j categories. If I condition on activity then the three activities
are: only studying (s), only working (l) and combining work with school (c).
In the empirical model I also use a classication with ve activities (adding
the inactive and the unemployed category to the above classication).23
However the key points can be made across these three activities outcomes
(a). The outcome variable yj





The key assumptions that underlie the model concern the determinants of
the propensity to \sort" into a given activity a (the observables in Z and
the unobservables, j).
This paper focuses on the unbiased estimation of labor market eects
also controlling by the implementation of the FEL in times of changes. For
this reason, I go into the details of the specication, the variables of interest,
controls and identication issues of both labor market eects and the FEL
in Section 4.
2.3 Hypothesis Testing
Within this framework, one could expect to test at least four hypotheses
(or questions) on schooling-employment decisions for school-aged youth. I
am most interested in the rst three, while the last serves as robustness
tests: First, does human capital investment go up because fewer jobs are
available (substitution eect). This can be tested with a set of urban-area
labor market variables that will act as a measure of the opportunity cost of
staying in school.
Second, does human capital investment go down during crises because
fewer jobs and/or depressed wages are available to those who would have
liked to combine work and school (income eect) . Here the same labor
markets variables will be interpreted dierently depending on the sign of
the coecient and on the activity category. For instance, job rates are
expected to have a positive impact on those youth combining school and
work because it increases the probability of funding their studies.
Thirdly, might human capital also go up due to the \illegality" of not
being in school arising from the Federal Education Law (FEL). I should be
able to identify this eect by performing a before and after FEL comparison
for each group of provinces that implemented the Law in dierent years.
That is, I look at 13-18-year-olds in provinces j at t   1 and at t and in
subsequent years (t being the year when the FEL is implemented). 24
23 The inactivity rate increased until 1998 and then fell until 2002, which can potentially
matter for selection issues.
24Given that there are still time-varying factors that are unobserved for the researcher,
I do not claim to be identifying a causal eect, but rather controlling by this eect.
11Fourthly, human capital investment might also go down during crises
if school-aged youth have to take jobs because crisis/unemployment has
aected some jobs more than others (e.g. parents/older siblings lose their
jobs) and their households are unable to smooth consumption, then this will
increase their marginal cost of attending school, leading to a slower (if school
is combined with work) or lower investment (if drop-out occurs) in human
capital (income eect). To test this, I use the same labor market variables
but split by age groups. I expect the unemployment rate at the urban-area
level of adults and older siblings to have a negative eect on enrollment, and
a positive eect on the probability of working. 25
For each one of the hypotheses above I perform the analysis by gender,
as outcomes are suspected to be dierent for girls and boys for two reasons:
the acceptability of child labor and the employment opportunities may dier
by genders. 26
2.4 Testing IIA
Hausman and McFadden (1984) proposed a Hausman-type of the IIA prop-
erty. A Hausman test is based on the comparison of two estimators of the
same parameters. One estimator is consistent and ecient if the null hy-
pothesis is true, while the second estimator is consistent but inecient.
Therefore Hausman and McFadden (1978) suggest that if a subset of
the choices truly is irrelevant with respect to the other alternatives, omit-
ting it from the model will not lead to inconsistent estimates. Therefore,
Hausman's (1978) specication test can be used to test for IIA.
3 Data and Sample
3.1 Data
All of the following regressions are estimated using all available individual
and household level observations from the 1992{2003 May rounds of the En-
cuesta Permanente de Hogares or Argentine Permanent Household Survey
(EPH hereafter). The survey is conducted twice per year (May and October)
in urban areas by the Instituto Nacional de Estad sticas y Censos (INDEC).
25 Human capital might also go up due to incentives arising from the increasing returns
to college over this period, which have increased dramatically in Argentina over the last
15 years (See Fiszbein et al (2005) and Lpez B oo, 2008). To test this eect I use wages
(both for the unskilled and the skilled) as a measure of the opportunity cost.
26 Marchionni and Sosa Escudero (1998) found that drop-out rates were higher for boys
than for girls aged 13-19 in the Greater Buenos Aires. Rucci (2004) also nds that 12-17
year-old males were more likely to drop out of school during the 1998-2002 Argentine
crises, while 12-17 year-old girls were not as likely to do so. For instance, the types of jobs
available for 13-18-year-olds in Argentina seem to be better suited to boys than to girls (e.g.
cardboard collection, car window cleaning and other informal street jobs). Unfortunately,
if girls are working at home, this is not going to be recorded in the household surveys.
12The sampling is a two-stage random sample. In a rst stage, census areas
are chosen with proportional probability according to their size. These pri-
mary units are stratied according to the heads education. In a second stage,
households are chosen using a systematic sampling method. The survey is
designed as a rotating panel. Each household appears in four consecutive
waves and after that, it is removed to be replaced with a new household.
Therefore, in principle, I could construct a two-year panel. However, at-
trition is a major problem and I therefore treat the data as repeated cross
sections. 27
As the last available year (2003) only has comparable data available for
the May wave, I have decided to take only May waves for all calculations.28
This implies that only 13 out of 31 urban areas were left, with these urban
areas surveyed for all Mays between 1992 and 2003. I include previous years
in despite of the fact that I am missing several urban areas (either because
those were not surveyed or because relevant information, such as identi-
cation of dierent sources of earnings, was missing before 1996) because I
want to analyze year-to year variation and compare the results from the
2002 shock with those from the 1995 shock. I have an average of 5,200 13-18
year olds per wave, per year.
3.2 Sample
For the analysis of school-employment decisions across urban areas I take the
sample of secondary school-aged youth in the cross section (e.g. I compare
13-18 year olds in 1992, with 13-18 year olds in 1997, and so forth) that
have already completed mandatory primary school (85 percent of the sample
of this cohort for all years). This is the group that is closest to marginal
decisions in terms of schooling-employment for various reasons: rst, almost
all 5-12 year olds are attending school by the end of the period under analysis
as shown in Figure 1. In fact, 96 percent of 12-14 year olds were already
attending school in 1997 (the year before the recession began). The sample
of youth between the ages of 14 and 18 is then particularly interesting as
they work in a limited number of job categories and for limited hours. The
Ministry of Education claims that this group can only work if they have
completed compulsory schooling, which normally ends at age 15 (since the
FEL in 1997; before then compulsory schooling ended at age 12).29
27 Each panel therefore will have 25% of the population of a wave (i.e. As 25% of
the sample 'leaves' in each wave, then after two years only 25% of the original sample is
left). However, less than a half of that original 25% is present. The crisis does not seem
to increase the attrition relative to previous waves. I also tried to use short panels as
McKenzie (McKenzie 2003) but the attrition was even worse for the 13-18 year-olds that
conform my sample
28 Given that surveys cover only urban areas, most statistics are not signicantly aected
by seasonality issues.
29 Before the reform, the minimum age required to start high school was 13 years as of
the 30th of June of the entry year. With this reference, an 18-year old student will be in
133.3 Descriptive statistics
Tables 2 present additional basic statistics of the variables used in the anal-
ysis for the sample of 61,672 urban 13-18 year olds. Years of education of
the household head in our sample increased by almost 1 year from 1992 to
2002, while per capita household income went down by almost 50 percent
over the whole period. The participation in terms of population of urban
areas has stayed fairly constant, while the unemployment rate has tripled,
from 6.6 percent in 1992 to 20.4 in 2002 (average being 12.8 percent).
On the other hand, 54 percent of the youth in the sample end up in an
urban area (province) that has fully implemented the FEL, but it represents
62 per cent of total enrollment for 13{18 year olds as shown in the last
column of Table 1. That column shows more explicitly whether a province
is available in the dataset for every year. I have then comparable data from
1992 to 2003 for 10 out of 24 provinces (or 7 out of 17 that fully implemented
the Law).
I show the trends of the 5 possible states: school only, work only, school
and work, inactive and unemployed only in Table 3. On average, around six
percent of the adolescents are reported to be working, 7.3 inactive and 78.8
percent of children are in school.
4 Empirical and Identication Strategy
As follows from Section 2.2, I estimate two equations: rst, a by-year equa-
tion; and second, a pooled equation:
yiakt = Ukt + FELkt + 
Ziakt + a + iakt (3)
Following the literature on education and labor supply decisions, the
determinants of the propensity of a young adult i to sort into a given activity
a in urban area k at time t, yiakt, will depend on: Z, a matrix of observable
controls at the young adult (or household) level, with plausible determinants
of expected earnings, schooling participation and the reservation wage as
independent variables; U, a set of urban area variables and FEL the binary
variable that takes the value 1 for individuals that reside in urban area k
that have completely implemented the FEL in a given year. That is, in 1997
this dummy will capture only those youth living in the two provinces that
have implemented the Law (vis- a-vis the provinces that did not implement
the Law), while in 1999 it will capture those living in the four provinces that
implemented the Law between 1996 and 1998.30
the last year of high school.
30 The Statistics Institute surveys urban areas within provinces, so I actually have 12
urban areas distributed in 8 provinces. Accordingly, standard errors are always clustered
at the urban area level.
14In the pooled data version below, k is the urban area xed eect and t
is the intercept in period t (the period eect), and standard errors are always
clustered at the urban area level. If the variation in wages/employment is
reduced by including the full set of year dummies, the remaining variation is
not enough to identify a signicant eect of the urban area wage/employment
on schooling and employment outcomes. To solve this I include a crisis year
dummy instead of year dummies.
yiakt = Ukt + FELkt + 
Ziakt + k + t + a + iakt (4)
Thus the empirical strategy consists of the following steps: Firstly, I
estimate the determinants of the schooling-work decision which was at the
core of the theoretical and econometric model, distinguishing between peo-
ple that are: only in school, only employed (any type: i.e. self, salaried
formal or informal, in the public or private sector), both attending school
and employed, unemployed and inactive. This schooling-employment choice
is modelled using a multinomial logit.31 32 In Z I have age dummies and a
male dummy to take account of the fact that how close a child is to marginal
schooling decisions and his gender will make a dierence in the decision to
continue with school or to drop out. Z also includes a vector of house-
hold/family characteristics that may determine the reservation wage and
parental decisions regarding human capital investment of youth, including
the education level of the head of the household as a control for permanent
income, household size as a measure of the \quality-quantity trade o" (i.e.
whether larger households do not send their ospring to school as much
as smaller households, given that I already have a control for per capita in-
come), and the log of per{capita income of the household (excluding youth's
earnings).33 Household income matters for at least two reasons. First, the
convexity in the earnings-education prole makes a large budget necessary
when considering education as an investment. Second, it serves as a control
for transitory income eects. Education of the spouse and other adults in the
household will also be included as controls. These variables will determine
the sorting decisions.
Secondly, I add urban-area level labor market variables (U) to identify
the eects of local labor market conditions, which I argue identify the shock
much better than, for instance, the trend of the Brazil-Argentina exchange
rate as used in a previous study by Rucci (2003). This follows the existing
literature on the eects of economic shocks and changing local labor market
conditions on schooling and employment (Beegle et al, 2005a; Duryea et al,
31 In principle, and for simplication I pool both full time and part time work, but I
split these two as a robustness check (results are available upon request).
32In theory, the variables in Z might dier for each alternative (only employment, only
school, etc) but I simplify this for now.
33I consider youth as secondary workers; in other words, child labor or schooling deci-
sions are made after the income of the household adults has been determined.
152007; de Janvry et al, 2006) . These variables serve to test for the hypotheses
I presented in Section 2.3. I exploit the variation in labor market variables
over time and across urban areas in Argentina as a way of testing the \pull"
eect from dierent opportunities in distinct regional labor markets and see
whether this eect holds over crises.
For this purpose I include the following measures: (i) Job rates: num-
ber of employed unskilled 18-62 year-old adults (i.e. less than 12 years of
education) divided by the total 18-62 year-old population in urban area k
as another measure of the opportunity cost of attending school; (ii) Unem-
ployment rates: number of unemployed unskilled 18-62 year-olds divided
by the labor force (i.e. 18-62 year-old actively looking for work) 34. This
variable serves to test for \additional worker" eects as well; (iii) Wages of
low-skilled workers: average wage of those unskilled workers aged 30-35 in
urban area k.35
My main measure of the opportunity cost is then the job rate at the
urban-area level because the number of jobs available is a better indicator
than employment rates per se for labor market shocks in Argentina given the
persistence of the \discouraged worker" eect. This is measure is represented
in Figure 6
Thirdly, to control for the eect of the Federal Education Law (over and
above labor market eects at the urban area level), I add the dummy FEL
(constructed from column (ii) of Table 1) in the years when the FEL was
adopted in a particular set of provinces (FEL=1 if individual i is in province
j where the Federal Education Law was fully implemented in year t).
Following Card and Krueger (1994) and Du
o (2001), I exploit the varia-
tion in \treatment" intensity induced by the timing of the programme across
regions and cohorts to control for the eect of the implementation of the Law
on school attendance and employment. This relies on a 'pseudo' dierences-
in-dierences strategy. I condition on urban area xed eects when using
pooled data and I use a before{and{after comparison (when using by-year
regressions). 36 37
In all the tables, the estimated coecients of the multinomial logits
re
ect the eect of each explanatory variable on the likelihood of becoming
either: student only, employed only, student and employed, unemployed or
idle.
Lastly, as a robustness check I consider age groups (13/14, 15/16, 17/18)
34 I also used the unemployment rate by skill level and age group and this did not
change the main results
35This is the wage rate that youth would expect if they decide to enter the labor force.
I also used the wage of those 18-62 and results did not change.
36 In pooled regressions I identify variation in local labor market conditions eects from
the variation in employment within each urban area.
37 In the by-year regressions inclusion of urban xed eects would not allow the iden-
tication of neither the labor market opportunities or the Federal Education Law at the
urban-area level.
16separately because dierent factors (including returns to education, family
background and other labor market conditions) may have dierential eects
depending on how close a child is to marginal schooling decisions. A further
advantage of considering the age groups separately is that this lessens the
risk of biases due to more able youth progressing more in school (i.e. school
continuation selectivity on the basis of unobserved ability).38
5 Results
5.1 Determinants of schooling-employment decisions: trends
and determinants
Figure 7 provides a graphical representation of the estimates from the multi-
nomial logit in Table 4 (basic specication). The y-axis shows the predicted
probability of ending up in each category restricted for an individual 13-18
year old and a given education level of the head of household (as a proxy of
parental background), holding all other youth characteristics constant at the
sample means. The x-axis shows the number of years of education. These
probabilities sum to one for all education groups. I estimate this by gen-
der for 1992, 1996, 1998 and 2002, and I consider the correlation between
education and the predicted probabilities of entering each activity.
The predicted probability of school only increases rapidly with years of
education of the head of household both for males and females as shown by
the slope of the green area in the gure. While the predicted probabilities
of work only (red area), combining work and school (light grey area), un-
employment (dark grey area), and inactivity (black area); all decrease with
increasing years of education of the household head. The decreasing size
of the red, light and dark grey areas shows that the probability of working
(either combining it with school or not) and unemployment decreases sub-
stantially over time, and it is always substantially lower for females. From
1992 until 2001 the probability of inactivity increases sharply for both gen-
ders, but this tendency reverses in 2002.39
The main contrast between males and females appears appears in the
inactivity category. Females whose parent had less than completed primary
school (seven years of education) have a much higher predicted probability of
being neither at school, nor in the labor force. It is only when the parent has
10 years of education or more than the predicted probabilities start to look
more alike between males and females. Still the probability of combining
38 Cameron and Heckman (1998) for instance claim that most of the literature on the
eects of parental background on children's attaintment concludes that the eect of family
background declines after secondary schooling but that these estimates suer from omitted
ability bias because more able children normally progress more in the education system.
39There is an extensive literature on the the \discouraged worker" eect aecting inac-
tivity levels in Argentina (Altimir and Beccaria 2001)
17work and school is much higher for males, even those with highly educated
parents.
The marginal eects for the basic specication are shown in Table 4
for 13-18 year olds by selected years. Age dummies, gender and household-
level variables have the expected sign and do not change substantially across
specications.
As expected, attendance is a decreasing function of age (not reported).
This is particularly evident for the 18-year olds who have a 60 percent lower
predicted probability of attending school only and a higher predicted prob-
ability of either combining work with school (10 percent) or only working
(50 percent) than a 13 year-old. The (negative) marginal eect of the male
dummy decreases over time (from 2 to 0 percent), particularly after 1998,
showing a smaller gap between males and females in attendance and a quite
stable predominance of young males in the labor force (there is a positive
and signicant sign of around 2 percent of the male dummy in the only
work, work and school and unemployed categories that fades away in 2002).
The importance of the years of schooling of the head of the household de-
creases over time, in particular from 1998 for all categories. This may re
ect
the declining importance of \permanent income". Moreover, this variable
is not signicant for those combining work with school. The household size
estimate re
ects the same decreasing trend. The relationship between the
size of the household and the probability of ending up in school (working) is
negative (positive) and signicant, supporting the presence of a 'quantity-
quality' trade-o in household decisions in Argentina.
5.2 The eect of local labor market opportunities on schooling-
employment decisions
As a preview of results, Figure 8 shows the age range that is closer to
marginal decisions and for the sake of clarity I only show males in 1992
(baseline), 1996 (year after 1995 crisis) and 2002 (year after 2001 crisis). It
is very clear from this picture that attendance (green area) has increased
from 1992 to 2002, while the probability of either working (with or without
combining it with school), being unemployed or inactive has shrunk over
this 10-year period.
On the other hand, the trend from 1992 to 1996 shows an important
increase in unemployment, inactivity and the combination of work with
school at the expense of an important decrease in the rate of 15-18 year-olds
working (red area), on average.
Moreover, the decline in schooling attendance in 1996 was not evenly
distributed across groups. Children with highly educated heads actually
increased their probability of attendance, while youths with less educated
heads reduced their probability of attendance and also of work, while they
increased their probability of either unemployment or inactivity. In 2002,
18the increase in schooling was more evenly distributed across groups, even if
those youths with less educated heads still have higher probabilities of work,
unemployment and inactivity than those with highly educated heads. 40
In Table 4 I include household and child characteristics thought to in-

uence the supply of child labor and schooling, and therefore controlled as
much as possible by labor supply shifters. I now test whether urban areas
variables (after controlling by the FEL) remain signicant if included in
this specication. If the relationship between child labor and urban labor
markets is entirely due to variation in labor supply, and the additional con-
trols adequately capture this variation, then the urban area variables should
no longer be signicant.
Pool regression In Table 6 I pool boys and girls across the 10 years and
include as explanatory variables the log of income received by adults in the
household as well as the log of wages and the job rates for the low-skilled in
the appropriate urban area and year.
I show ve specications: column (1) is the baseline without any labor
market variable; in column (2) the log of wages of unskilled workers is added
along its interaction with the dummy of crisis year, while column (3) only
takes out the income variables. Column (4) and (5) replicate columns (2) and
(3) but use job rate instead of low wages as a measure of the opportunity cost.
To test whether household behavior changes during an economic crisis, the
urban area wage/job rate is interacted with a dummy variable representing
the crises years of 1995 and 2002. These are selected as the crisis years in
the analysis because GDP per capita was at its lowest levels.
The probability of attending school is lower for boys and lower for older
children while these factors increase the probability of working. The edu-
cation of the household head, is positively and signicantly associated with
an increased probability of attending school and a decreased probability of
working, combining work with school or being unemployed. The proxy for
transitory household income, the log of income received by adults in the
household, is also associated with a signicant increase in the probability
of attending school and a signicant decrease in the probability of working,
combining work with school and unemployment.
An increase in the urban area average wage of less skilled in column
(2) is associated with a signicant decrease in the probability of attending
school (6 percent), suggesting that opportunity costs draw youth away from
secondary school. The same happens in column (4) with the job rates mea-
sures, even if the size of the eect is much smaller. The signicantly higher
probability of working with respect to a higher urban area level wage (or
employment) conrms that for Argentina, the labor market is contending for
youths' time. While the eect of transitory household income is not found
40 Average predicted probabilities for the 13-18 year-olds are shown in Table 5
19to be signicantly dierent during the crisis years (same result as Duryea
and Kuenning, 2003) the substitution eect as measured by the urban area
wage is signicantly smaller in magnitude (the interaction is positive in
columns 2 and 3). This suggests that opportunity costs of the labor market
provide an important countervailing eect during \normal" economic down-
turns (1995) but that this eect is attenuated during a crisis when families
expectations change in response to a deep shock. However, the interaction
of job rates and crisis years is negative in columns 4 and 5 (but very small
and non-signicant). 41
Regressions in columns (2) and (4) show the net eect of the change
in labor market conditions after controlling for income at the household
level. This approach is the appropriate one for identifying the income and
substitution eects. Still one may speculate which eect dominates in a
downturn. Regressions in columns (3) and (5) then drops the family in-
come such that the parameter of the urban area-level wage in column (3)
or job rates in column (5) measure the overall eect on youth behavior of
a labor market downturn. Schooling over periods of \typical" 
uctuations
is slightly counter-cyclical with children shifting from work to school as la-
bor market conditions deteriorate (either wages or employment). Again the
signicantly dierent coecient of urban area wages (columns 2 and 3) dur-
ing Argentina's worst years suggests that the typical relationship between
youth' time use and macroeconomic conditions does not necessarily hold
during a crisis. One again this interaction term during crisis is very small
and non-signicant when using the job rates variables, which indicates that
the counter-cyclical behavior in schooling remains in place. I now go and
explore further this last relationship in by-year regressions.
By-year regressions In order to see annual changes I estimate by-year
regressions. The preferred specication in Table 7 I test whether labor
market variables, a proxy for opportunity costs, have (i) any eect over
schooling-employment decisions and (ii) whether those eects vary during
crises.
Job rates have the expected sign for all categories (negative for the only
school and positive for all others). However, the exception is the crisis year
of 2002. Another important point to note is that even if the job rate actually
experienced by youth is lower than the unskilled adult rate, dierences across
urban areas and over time are likely to be similar for the youth rate and
the unskilled adult rate as they are moved by the same macroeconomic
conditions.
For non-crisis years, the opportunity cost draws youth away from school
as shown in the rst panel of both tables and also in the coecient for those
41By adding dummy variables for each urban area, I identify local market condition
eects o of the variation in wages/employment within each urban area.
20working or searching for a job in the second to fourth panel. In a crisis year
like such as 2002 the substitution eect behaves dierently: the eect of the
job rate on schooling is positive and signicant in Table 7. 42
For the rst category (only school), the largest coecient on job rates is
for 1994 (1.23 percent), a high employment year, while the lowest marginal
eect is found in 2002, a very low employment rate year (0.5 percent). For
the second category (only work), it is interesting to note that the estimate
on job rates (even if small) is negative in 2002, perhaps re
ecting some non-
linearities of the eect of jobs rates below a threshold level. Also, the eect
on those combining work and school in 2002 (0.02 percent) is about one
tenth the size in 2000 (0.1 percent), which again re
ects the diminishing
importance of labor market variables in the schooling-employment decision.
In Table 8, unemployment rates, in turn, are partly measuring opportu-
nity cost but also act as a control for the increases in inactivity rates fueled
by the high unemployment rates in Argentina over the mid-1990s. They also
serve to measure the extent of the \additional worker" eect over crises.
Unemployment is indeed positively and signicantly correlated with in-
activity in the fth panel until 1998 when the correlation becomes negative
but is insignicant afterwards. On the other hand, the relationship between
unemployment and the probability of combining work and school or only
working (second and third panels in the table) is an interesting example of
how this relationship might change with the macroeconomic environment.
For both categories the estimate is positive, but it becomes much smaller
in 2002, while is not signicant for the working only category. Moreover,
unemployment is negatively correlated with the probability of working in
all years, except in the two post-crisis years of 1996 and 2002, when that
relationship is positive, which could be interpreted as the conrmation of
\additional worker" eects happening after crises.
I have replicated the above analysis for various sub-samples: the 13/14
year-olds separated from the 15/16-year-olds and the 17/18-year-olds. Re-
sults show that dierent age cohorts behave systematically dierently, namely
in that older cohorts (15 to 18 year-olds) are much more sensitive to changes
in the labor market variables (results are not reported but available upon
request). Probably one of the reasons why previous studies have found con-
tradictory results is because they failed to control for these age-eects and
to consider the appropriate sample (secondary school youth).
I also replicated my preferred specication by gender: the \2002 result"
still holds (i.e. the coecient of job rates on the likelihood of being in school
42 Age dummies and gender and household variables do not change in size or magnitude
when including urban area variables. I have also included unemployment rates in this
same regression and results are available upon request.
21switches sign from negative to positive). However, in general, labor market
variables despite having the expected sign, show larger coecients for boys
than for girls, which is perhaps the re
ection of dierent attitudes by parents
towards boys versus girls in terms of employment. For instance, from 1992
to 2001 (before the crisis), an increase of 10 percent in the job rates will
decrease schooling by 6 percent for boys and only by 3 percent for girls.
Another gender dierence is the eect of temporary income shocks:
household (per capita) income has a large eect on attendance for girls
in 2002, while it is not signicant for boys. Income decreases the probability
of being only working for girls in 2002, but it does not seem to aect it for
boys. Results are not reported but are available upon request. 43
As another robustness test (not reported) I included in the regressions
a dummy indicating whether the school attended was private of public as a
proxy for the quality of school (this information is only available after 1995),
and again results remain unaltered.
Lastly, Table 9, presents dierent scenarios (i.e. marginal eects) based
on Table 7 for three baseline years: one non-crisis year (1992), one start-of-
crisis year along with the end of implementation of the Federal Education
Law (2000), and a crisis year (2002). These are estimates that come from
changes in either the FEL or from the job rate.
I demonstrate with this summary table that in \typical" years deterio-
rating job rates increase the probability of attending school and decrease the
probability of combining work and school. After controlling for household
and individual characteristics a 10 percent decrease in the job rate alone has
been responsible for a 5.4 percent rise in the probability of school attendance
since 2000 (0.054 in Table 9). This substitution eect becomes positive in
2002 (-0.046 in the same Table). These estimates account for the fact that
a new Federal Education Law (FEL) in 1996 extended mandatory educa-
tion to 10 years and might have aected schooling outcomes. Dierences
across regions in implementation and dierences in exposure across cohorts
induced by the timing of the Law allow me to show that youth in provinces
fully implementing the FEL in 2000 (when the last set of provinces imple-
mented the Law) were only 3 percentage points more likely to be in school
and 1.6 percentage points less likely to be working in 1998. 44
43 Figure 8 also showed that the probability of being inactive is positively related to
being female regardless of the macroeconomic conditions. This may be an indication that
labor market variables do not have any pull eect on them, and that more structural
variables are behind female-labor decisions.
44 Still when I compute the probability conditional on the number of years since the
implementation of FEL, that increase in the \intensity" (i.e. higher exposure to the Law)
does not imply an increase in the probability of being only in school (not reported).
226 Conclusions
This paper examines the patterns of investment in human capital over the
1992-2003 period for secondary-school aged youth in Argentina covering the
profound economic crisis of the 1998-2002 period. The main nding is that
households were reluctant to reduce human capital investment and there is
no evidence of a drop in school attendance. Indeed, the probability of being
in school (and not working) increased by 6 percentage points over the crisis
period. This increase was at the expense of being inactive (-2.5 percentage
points), combining work and school (-1.9 percentage points) and only work-
ing (-1.6 percentage points). During the 2002 crisis, youth were almost 1.8
percentage points less likely to combine work with school than in 1998, and
3 percentage points less likely than in 1994 (a high employment year). This
rst result suggests that macroeconomic crises do not always slow human
capital accumulation. I argue that previous results have been contradic-
tory for two reasons: rst, the chosen sample and second, the identication
strategy. None of the existing papers used the secondary-school aged youth,
which is the relevant age range. Besides, there has not been a clear identi-
cation strategy for the shock, while wages, employment and unemployment
are the best indicators of macroeconomic conditions in Argentina.
I was able to disentangle the aggregate labor market eects of the cri-
sis and those of the FEL itself, both identied at the urban area level, on
schooling decisions. I used adult unskilled (less than 12 years of education)
job rates, unemployment and wages to identify the eect of 
uctuating la-
bor markets and a dummy (=1 if child i is in a province that has fully
implemented the Federal Education Law) to control by this new Education
Policy.
Overall, I found that the pull eect from labor markets has been much
larger in high employment years than in low employment years and it has
almost disappeared in 2002 (in both pool and by-year regressions; and with
any of the opportunity cost proxies).
However (and despite the smaller marginal eects on schooling decisions)
absolute changes in employment from 1998 to 2002 has been strong enough
to provoke increasing attendance rates in this period. This suggests that
opportunity costs of the labor market provide an important countervailing
eect during \typical" economic downturns (1993-2001) but that this eect
is attenuated during a crisis when household expectations change in response
to a shock (2002).
The actual 6 percentage point decrease in the average job rate from
1998 to 2002 in Argentina seems to have increased the proportion of youth
in school by 3 percentage points (evaluated at the 2000 coecient), or half
23of the total observed increase in attendance.45 46 Boys are more aected
by labor market variables than girls which might be related to households'
views on work and/or dierent job opportunities for boys versus girls.
There are two major policy implications: rst, given the discrepancy
in ndings reported in the literature, further research is needed to under-
stand which macroeconomic crises do lead to a slow down in schooling and
which do not. Second, where aggregate 
uctuations in income do not seem
to worsen schooling outcomes, it might be more sensible to establish poli-
cies to protect the quality of education (i.e. repetition, test scores, etc.),
consumption and health rather than focus on reducing schooling drop-out
rates.
45The job rate went down from 54 percent in 1998 to 48 percent in 2002 (or 6 percentage
points)
46 At the same time, by May 2000 the Federal Education Law increased attendance
rates by 3 percentage points in those provinces implementing the Law compared to those
not implementing it. As FEL provinces are 54 percent of the sample, this implies a total
increase in attendance of 1.6 percentage points (.54 times .03).
247 Appendix
Denitions of variables in regressions
Dependent variable in equations: Schooling decision =1 if attend-
ing school only, =2 if working only, =3 if working and in school, =4 if
unemployed only, =5 if inactive (i.e. no work, no school, no looking for a
job).
Age dummies: Built based on the continuous variable age in years
(i.e. age13, ..age18)
Male dummy: =1 if male, 0 otherwise
Household Head's Schooling years : Years of education completed
(computed at average of educational category for period 1992-1994)
Household size number of individuals in the household.
Log per-capita household income (excluding child earnings) (log-
pchhy) Log of per-capita real household income (at 1998 prices) excluding
the earnings of all those less than 18 year-old in the household.
Job rate (urban-area level) Number of adult individuals unskilled (less
than 12 years schooling) employed, divided by the total of 18-62 year old in
the urban area, regardless of their activity condition.
Unemployment (urban-area level) Number of adult unemployed in-
dividuals unskilled (less than 12 years schooling) divided by the labor force
(i.e 18-62-year-olds reporting that they are actively looking for a job in the
reference week).
Log wage (urban area) Log of wages of young (30-35 year-olds) unskilled
workers (less than 12 years schooling) in the urban area
Treatment dummy (Federal Education Law) =1 if individual i is in
province j where the Federal Education Law was fully implemented in year
t.
Crisis year = 1 if year=1995 or 2002
258 Figures
Figure 1: Schooling Attendance (top) and Employment Rate (bottom), by
Age
Source: Author's calculations, EPH, Argentina. May waves, 5-25 year{old, 1992, 1999 and 2002.
26Figure 2: Combining School and Work (top) and Unemployment rate (bot-
tom), by Age
Source: Author's calculations, EPH, Argentina. May waves, 5-25 year{old, 1992, 1999 and 2002.
27Figure 3: Inactive, by age
Source:Author's calculations, EPH, Argentina. May waves, 5-25 year{old, 1992, 1999 and 2002.
28Figure 4: Schooling attendance, by secondary school age groups and gender.
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Source: Author's calculations based on Argentina EPH, May waves. Note: The red line shows
the presence of a structural break in the attendance trend as per the Zivot-Andrews (1992) unit
root test.
Figure 5: Private marginal benets and private marginal costs of human
capital investments






















































1990 1995 2000 2005
year
Gran La Plata Ciudad de Buenos AiresConurbano Jujuy-Palpala Salta
Source: Author's calculations, EPH, Permanent Household Surveys Argentina. May
waves
30Figure 7: Predicted Choice by Education Level of Household Head, Holding
Other Characteristics at the Mean. Males and females 13-18 years old: 1992,
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
years of schooling HH head
Argentina 2002
Only attending school Only working
Attending school and working Unemployed
Doing nothing
Source: Author's calculations based on Argentina's EPH, May waves. Predicted probabilities after MNL
estimation in Table 4. 31Figure 8: Predicted Choice by Education Level of Household Head, Holding
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
years of schooling HH head
Argentina 2002
Only attending school Only working
Attending school and working Unemployed
Doing nothing
Source: Author's calculations based on Argentina's EPH, May waves. Predicted probabilities after MNL
estimation in Table 4.
329 Tables
33Table 1: The process of the Federal Education Law (FEL) implementation
in Argentina's provinces.
Implementation Enrolment Available data
Year Full Mode Years(*) % 1996 1992/2002 1996 & 2001
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
CABA (**) No No 0 9.02 Yes Yes
Buenos Aires 1996 Yes U 5 37.28 Yes Yes
Catamarca 1999 Yes P 2 0.95 No Yes
Cordoba 1996 Yes U 5 8.82 Yes Yes
Corrientes 1997 Yes U 4 2.42 No Yes
Chaco 1997 No P 0 2.53 No Yes
Chubut 1999 Yes P 2 1.29 Yes Yes
Entre Rios 1997 Yes U 4 3.16 Yes Yes
Formosa 1998 Yes U 3 1.29 No Yes
Jujuy 1998 No P 0 2.19 Yes Yes
La Pampa 1997 Yes U 4 0.74 Yes Yes
La Rioja 1999 Yes P 2 0.80 No Yes
Mendoza 2000 No P 0 4.17 No Yes
Misiones 1998 Yes U 3 2.14 No Yes
Neuqu en 1998 No P 0 1.51 Yes Yes
R o Negro No No 0 1.60 No Yes
Salta 1998 No P 0 3.59 Yes Yes
San Juan 1997 Yes U 4 1.61 No Yes
San Luis 1998 Yes U 3 0.94 Yes Yes
Santa Cruz 1998 Yes U 3 0.60 Yes Yes
Santa Fe 1997 Yes U 4 8.08 No Yes
Stg del Estero 1998 Yes U 3 1.80 No Yes
Tucum an 1998 Yes U 3 3.19 No Yes
Tierra del Fuego 1998 Yes P 3 0.29 No Yes
% students covered 62% 100%
Source: Author's calculations, EPH, Permanent Household Surveys Argentina, May
waves; Education Ministry (www.me.gov.ar/cgecse/index.html) and (Crosta 2007). Note
1: In mode of implementation in (column (iii): No=No implementation, U=generalized
implementation, P=gradual implementation. Note 2: (*) Years since implementation are




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 4: Marginal eects, School-Employment choice, 13-18 year olds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
1 Attending school only
male -0.0220 -0.0428 -0.0248 -0.0305 -0.0155 -0.00106
(-2.37) (-4.30) (-2.59) (-3.36) (-2.13) (-0.21)
Householdhead's schooling years 0.0177 0.0145 0.0168 0.0117 0.00747 0.00566
(12.30) (10.40) (11.62) (8.94) (6.37) (6.14)
Household size -0.0125 -0.0174 -0.0137 -0.00966 -0.00479 -0.00341
(-5.22) (-6.83) (-5.61) (-4.53) (-2.74) (-2.55)
logpchhy 0.0561 0.0889 0.0754 0.0326 0.0349 0.0184
(6.35) (9.78) (8.95) (5.05) (5.94) (4.54)
2 Working only
male 0.0390 0.0408 0.0277 0.0330 0.0138 0.00812
(7.88) (8.19) (6.29) (6.80) (3.98) (3.56)
Householdhead's schooling years -0.00693 -0.00478 -0.00399 -0.00328 -0.00207 -0.00107
(-9.18) (-7.70) (-6.26) (-6.16) (-3.98) (-3.34)
Household size 0.00437 0.00410 0.00282 0.00249 0.00141 0.00108
(4.06) (3.87) (3.34) (3.60) (2.42) (2.89)
logpchhy -0.0205 -0.0285 -0.0192 -0.0118 -0.00646 -0.00456
(-5.46) (-6.64) (-5.77) (-4.41) (-3.35) (-3.37)
3 Attending school and working
male 0.0159 0.0180 0.0120 0.0173 0.00567 0.00154
(4.00) (3.88) (3.75) (4.18) (1.66) (2.50)
Householdhead's schooling years -0.000771 -0.000697 -0.000205 -0.0000254 -0.000606 0.0000306
(-1.28) (-1.07) (-0.51) (-0.04) (-1.18) (0.33)
Household size 0.00206 0.00399 0.00139 0.00207 0.000517 -0.0000231
(1.97) (2.94) (1.46) (2.22) (0.67) (-0.18)
logpchhy -0.0152 -0.0176 -0.00742 -0.00792 -0.00993 -0.00142
(-4.39) (-4.14) (-2.96) (-3.17) (-4.47) (-4.01)
4 Unemployed
male 0.000706 0.0152 0.0130 0.000159 0.00730 0.00143
(3.46) (4.73) (3.66) (3.32) (2.93) (3.43)
Householdhead's schooling years -0.000138 -0.00136 -0.00333 -0.0000282 -0.00139 -0.000138
(-4.61) (-3.45) (-5.59) (-4.03) (-3.49) (-2.76)
Household size 0.000191 0.00216 0.00320 0.0000212 0.00100 0.000194
(4.04) (3.11) (3.99) (2.09) (1.93) (2.90)
logpchhy -0.000666 -0.0146 -0.0192 -0.000139 -0.00612 -0.000758
(-3.16) (-5.41) (-5.78) (-5.02) (-3.20) (-3.43)
5 Inactive
male -0.0336 -0.0312 -0.0279 -0.0199 -0.0113 -0.0100
(-5.05) (-5.42) (-4.40) (-3.23) (-2.68) (-2.28)
Householdhead's schooling years -0.00991 -0.00770 -0.00925 -0.00833 -0.00340 -0.00448
(-9.38) (-8.91) (-9.67) (-8.67) (-5.28) (-5.43)
Household size 0.00591 0.00714 0.00633 0.00508 0.00186 0.00216
(3.70) (5.33) (4.19) (3.37) (1.79) (1.86)
logpchhy -0.0197 -0.0282 -0.0296 -0.0128 -0.0124 -0.0117
(-2.90) (-5.26) (-5.55) (-2.77) (-3.92) (-3.31)
Urban area FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Age dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5,456 6,059 5,609 4,918 4,219 3,865
Pseudo   R2 0.193 0.182 0.188 0.200 0.204 0.211
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t statistics in parentheses  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Note 1: Estimates based on a MNL where base category (=5) is\inactive" I report marginal
eects based on logit coecients for each independent variable pertaining to the probability of
entering each of the 5 activities. The Hausman-test indicates that the specication of
school-employment choices above estimated does not violate the IIA assumption.
Table 5: Marginal eects, School-employment choices
Marginal eects after mlogit,%
Attending school only 0.874 0.855 0.867 0.901 0.929 0.959
Working only 0.038 0.039 0.030 0.023 0.014 0.007
Attending school and working 0.021 0.030 0.014 0.021 0.017 0.002
Unemployed 0.001 0.019 0.027 0.000 0.011 0.002
Inactive 0.065 0.056 0.062 0.056 0.028 0.031
Note 1: Estimates based on the MNL from Table 4 where base category (=5) is\inactive".
37Table 6: Marginal eects School-Employment choice and local labor mar-
kets. Pooled data, 1992-2002.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 Attending school only
male -0.0273 -0.0272 -0.0293 -0.0410 -0.0429
(-8.75) (-8.76) (-7.64) (-9.12) (-8.34)
Householdhead's schooling years 0.0142 0.0141 0.0192 0.0186 0.0249
(13.91) (14.00) (17.17) (12.85) (15.64)
logpchhy 0.0589 0.0595 0.0777
(8.92) (9.54) (8.90)
logpchhy X crisis year -0.00233 -0.000582 -0.00000701
(-0.48) (-0.13) (-0.00)
Crisis year 0.0105 -0.00274 -0.0135 -0.0000252 -0.0589
(0.38) (-0.10) (-0.70) (-0.00) (-0.52)
trend 0.0123 0.0105 0.00876 0.0151 0.0110
(6.18) (5.66) (4.61) (6.51) (4.09)
Log wage (urban area) -0.0585 -0.0191 
(-2.37) (-2.69)
Log wage (urban area) X crisis 0.00347 0.0151 
(3.15) (2.69)
Job rate(urban area) -0.00178 -0.00194 
(-2.32) (-1.89)
Job rate(urban area)X crisis -0.00180 -0.000311
(-1.08) (-0.22)
2 Working only
male 0.0276 0.0275 0.0299 0.0422 0.0448
(23.94) (24.05) (22.88) (18.97) (18.16)
Householdhead's schooling years -0.00372 -0.00369 -0.00521 -0.00553 -0.00760
(-13.92) (-14.05) (-15.83) (-12.29) (-13.69)
logpchhy -0.0157 -0.0157 -0.0231
(-7.90) (-8.38) (-7.66)
logpchhy X crisis year 0.00225 0.000821 0.000677
(1.87) (0.57) (0.40)
Crisis year -0.0115 -0.00866 -0.00504 -0.0421 -0.0327
(-2.41) (-2.06) (-1.14) (-4.09) (-2.43)
trend -0.00435 -0.00381 -0.00350 -0.00582 -0.00475
(-7.35) (-5.99) (-5.29) (-9.55) (-6.70)
Log wage (urban area) 0.0178 0.00782
(3.41) (1.37)
Log wage (urban area)X crisis 0.00603 0.00574
(0.80) (0.92)
Job rate(urban area) 0.00175 0.00200
(1.99) (2.63)
Job rate(urban area) X crisis 0.00129 0.000941
(2.64) (1.94)
3 Attending school and working
male 0.0108 0.0108 0.0113 0.0129 0.0134
(13.05) (13.22) (12.17) (12.91) (11.87)
Householdhead's schooling years -0.000580 -0.000567 -0.00142 -0.000477 -0.00145
(-3.30) (-3.22) (-6.63) (-2.43) (-6.08)
logpchhy -0.0107 -0.0109 -0.0127
(-8.06) (-8.34) (-8.32)
logpchhy X crisis year 0.00101 0.000911 0.000193
(0.65) (0.55) (0.09)
Crisis year -0.00923 -0.00579 -0.000582 -0.00836 0.00428
(-1.65) (-0.84) (-0.16) (-0.54) (0.19)
trend -0.00171 -0.00123 -0.000854 -0.00146 -0.000758
(-7.65) (-3.21) (-2.37) (-3.96) (-1.99)
Log wage (urban area) 0.0162 0.0103
(1.71) (1.12)
Log wage (urban area) X crisis -0.00399 -0.00579
(-1.00) (-1.23)
Job rate(urban area) 0.00163 0.00165
(2.97) (2.94)
Job rate(urban area)X crisis 0.000115 -0.000148
(0.29) (-0.39)
4 Unemployed
male 0.0116 0.0115 0.0118 0.0171 0.0174
(11.31) (11.11) (10.09) (12.83) (11.35)
Householdhead's schooling years -0.00241 -0.00238 -0.00341 -0.00351 -0.00499
(-9.84) (-9.53) (-10.69) (-9.25) (-10.79)
logpchhy -0.0127 -0.0128 -0.0189
(-8.62) (-9.06) (-9.18)
logpchhy X crisis year 0.00180 0.000477 0.00250
(1.55) (0.33) (1.21)
Crisis year -0.00723 -0.00342 0.00475 -0.0496 -0.0407
(-1.63) (-0.66) (0.60) (-4.12) (-2.69)
trend -0.00182 -0.00108 -0.000549 -0.00338 -0.00222
(-4.36) (-2.35) (-1.19) (-4.09) (-2.45)
Log wage (urban area) 0.0219 0.0148
(2.21) (1.25)
Log wage (urban area) X crisis 0.00493 -0.000411
(0.56) (-0.05)
Job rate(urban area) -0.00277 -0.00283
(-3.37) (-3.53)
Job rate(urban area) X crisis 0.00145 0.00118
(1.99) (1.62)
Urban area FE yes yes yes yes yes
Age dummies and FEL dummy yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 58254 58254 61517 48435 51155
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01,
 p < 0:001
See notes Table 4. Robust Huber-White standard errors are clustered at the urban-area
level. Eects on the inactive not reported but available upon request.
38Table 7: Marginal eects, School-Employment choice, Jobs and the Federal
Education Law, 13-18 year olds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1992 1994 1998 2000 2002
1 Attending school only
Householdhead's schooling years 0.0256 0.0214 0.0206 0.0156 0.00806
(9.14) (9.78) (13.69) (9.92) (6.19)
logpchhy 0.0703 0.117 0.0809 0.0529 0.0256
(3.23) (9.35) (7.53) (4.98) (4.72)
Job rate(urban area) -0.0122 -0.0123 -0.00981 -0.00538 0.00463
(-12.55) (-15.33) (-20.74) (-14.52) (12.14)
Treatment (FEL) 0.029 0.0308
(5.02) (6.06)
2 Working only
Householdhead's schooling years -0.0118 -0.00794 -0.00571 -0.00365 -0.00191
(-14.27) (-8.13) (-7.41) (-5.12) (-4.49)
logpchhy -0.0327 -0.0415 -0.0234 -0.0190 -0.00815
(-3.83) (-6.74) (-5.32) (-4.81) (-3.89)
Job rate(urban area) 0.00580 0.00435 0.00263 0.00190 -0.00123
(14.42) (13.28) (15.78) (11.20) (-4.35)
Treatment (FEL) -0.007 -0.0158
(-4.31) (-8.94)
3 Attending school and working
Householdhead's schooling years -0.00103 -0.000785 -0.000419 -0.000752 0.0000247
(-1.10) (-1.07) (-0.84) (-1.34) (0.20)
logpchhy -0.0172 -0.0190 -0.00892 -0.0111 -0.00139
(-4.63) (-4.90) (-4.16) (-4.36) (-6.67)
Job rate(urban area) 0.00451 0.00510 0.00142 0.00104 0.000225
(20.13) (27.92) (11.72) (11.57) (7.97)
Treatment (FEL) -0.00580 -0.00525
(-3.97) (-3.42)
4 Unemployed
Householdhead's schooling years -0.000230 -0.00255 -0.00399 -0.00250 -0.000174
(-3.61) (-3.43) (-6.39) (-7.16) (-2.03)
logpchhy -0.00111 -0.0254 -0.0264 -0.0127 -0.000940
(-3.21) (-5.54) (-7.92) (-4.81) (-3.76)
Job rate(urban area) 0.000146 0.00468 0.00445 0.000656 -0.0000239
(7.99) (13.89) (13.14) (5.58) (-1.82)
Treatment (FEL) - 0.0018 -0.0298
(-5.96) (-7.05)
5 Doing nothing
Householdhead's schooling years -0.0126 -0.0101 -0.0104 -0.00873 -0.00600
(-7.10) (-8.48) (-11.24) (-11.78) (-6.11)
logpchhy -0.0193 -0.0310 -0.0221 -0.0101 -0.0152
(-1.47) (-4.96) (-4.02) (-2.34) (-3.46)
Job rate(urban area) 0.00179 -0.00183 0.00131 0.00178 -0.00360
(3.26) (-4.06) (5.04) (10.16) (-10.14)
Treatment (FEL) 0.014 0.0201
(4.01) (6.62)
Age dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 4,471 5,009 4,321 3,735 3,235
Pseudo   R2 0.217 0.199 0.233 0.217 0.239
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t statistics in parentheses  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
See Notes Table 4. Robust Huber-White standard errors in parenthesis clustered at urban area
level.
39Table 8: Marginal eects, School-Employment choice, Unemployment and
FEL, 13-18 year olds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
1 Attending school only
Householdhead's schooling years 0.0194 0.0165 0.0182 0.0148 0.00885 0.00632
(9.69) (10.26) (8.67) (11.99) (9.93) (6.09)
logpchhy 0.0556 0.0913 0.0775 0.0536 0.0257 0.0208
(3.28) (11.16) (8.54) (7.88) (4.89) (6.20)
Unemployment rate (urban area) -0.00599 0.00609 -0.0128 0.00689 0.000779 -0.00523
(-22.15) (10.84) (-28.94) (11.60) (1.21) (-11.57)
Treatment (LFE) 0.029 0.0308
(5.02) (6.06)
2 Working only
Householdhead's schooling years -0.00756 -0.00524 -0.00427 -0.00392 -0.000160 -0.00123
(-14.26) (-8.47) (-5.91) (-6.77) (-3.95) (-3.42)
logpchhy -0.0205 -0.0289 -0.0196 -0.0153 -0.000810 -0.00506
(-3.77) (-7.32) (-12.12) (-5.10) (-9.80) (-4.31)
Unemployment rate (urban area) -0.000724 -0.00201 0.00200 -0.00199 -0.0000135 0.000393
(-6.37) (-7.02) (8.13) (-10.52) (-1.62) (2.81)
Treatment (LFE) -0.007 -0.0158
(-4.31) (-8.94)
3 Attending school and working
Householdhead's schooling years -0.000987 -0.00107 -0.000317 -0.000507 -0.000657 0.0000389
(-1.40) (-1.78) (-0.88) (-1.24) (-1.46) (0.32)
logpchhy -0.0151 -0.0183 -0.00763 -0.00651 -0.00942 -0.00151
(-4.68) (-5.57) (-3.77) (-4.51) (-4.12) (-6.29)
Unemployment rate (urban area) 0.000343 -0.000599 0.000781 0.000293 -0.000473 -0.0000248
(4.20) (-3.26) (7.28) (1.68) (-3.47) (-1.69)
Treatment (LFE) -0.00580 -0.00525
(-3.97) (-3.42)
4 Unemployed
Householdhead's schooling years -0.000203 -0.00160 -0.00369 -0.00238 -0.00168 -0.000410
(-3.98) (-2.98) (-10.12) (-5.11) (-3.66) (-2.10)
logpchhy -0.000805 -0.0151 -0.0198 -0.0148 -0.00784 -0.00209
(-3.10) (-5.58) (-6.95) (-14.23) (-4.27) (-4.07)
Unemployment rate (urban area) 0.0000286 0.000383 0.00275 -0.000471 0.00198 0.00345
(4.95) (3.57) (18.97) (-4.33) (3.48) (7.24)
Treatment (LFE) - 0.0017 -0.0288
(-5.96) (-7.05)
5 Doing nothing
Householdhead's schooling years -0.0107 -0.00862 -0.00997 -0.00804 -0.00635 -0.00472
(-7.78) (-8.82) (-5.43) (-9.79) (-9.76) (-6.08)
logpchhy -0.0192 -0.0290 -0.0305 -0.0170 -0.00760 -0.0121
(-1.87) (-5.67) (-5.07) (-4.48) (-2.49) (-4.07)
Unemployment rate (urban area) 0.00634 -0.00386 0.00722 -0.00472 -0.00227 0.00142
(30.00) (-14.06) (18.04) (-13.26) (-7.91) (10.13)
Treatment (LFE) 0.014 0.0201
(4.01) (6.62)
Observations 5,465 6,068 5,611 5,107 4,460 3,877
Pseudo   R2 0.217 0.199 0.183 0.212 0.201 0.206
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
See Notes Table 4. Robust Huber-White standard errors in parenthesis clustered at
urban area level.
40Table 9: Marginal eects for jointly determined outcomes
Prob. in school only Change from baseline
baseline 1992 0.850
10% decrease in job rate 0.972 0.122
baseline 2000 0.900
10% decrease in job rate 0.954 0.054
Federal Education Law 0.931 0.030
baseline 2002 0.948
10% decrease in job rate 0.902 -0.046
Prob. works only Change from baseline
baseline 1992 0.038
10% increase in job rate 0.096 0.058
baseline 2000 0.023
10% increase in job rate 0.049 0.026
Federal Education Law 0.007 -0.016
baseline 2002 0.007
10% increase in job rate -0.005 -0.012
Prob. in school and works Change from baseline
baseline 1992 0.021
10% increase in job rate 0.067 0.045
baseline 2000 0.021
10% increase in job rate 0.031 0.010
Federal Education Law 0.016 0.005
baseline 2002 0.002
10% increase in job rate 0.004 0.002
Note 1: Estimates based on a MNL where base category (=5) is\inactive" I report marginal
eects based on logit coecients for each independent variable pertaining to the probability of
entering each of the 5 activities. Note 2: Age, gender, household head's schooling years,
household size and per capita household income controls are included and signicant at 99%
level. Note 3: Baselines are evaluated using all variables kept at their means, including urban
area job rates. Note that I evaluate the scenario of decreasing job rates for the probability of
being in school only, and of increasing job rates for the other two probabilities, which provides a
more intuitive nal result.
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